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RELIGIOUS ACCOMMODATIONS IN EDUCATION:  
A COMPARISON OF NON-ESTABLISHMENT IN THE  
UNITED STATES AND ESTABLISHED RELIGION  
IN ENGLAND AND WALES 
Jaclyn Kass∗
I. INTRODUCTION 
Education is necessary for individuals to participate intelligently 
and effectively in society and to become self-sufficient citizens.  When 
children attend government-funded public schools, the government 
acts as an educator.1  Although the government has assumed the re-
sponsibility of inculcating young, impressionable people with knowl-
edge and values, the Supreme Court of the United States has not 
provided insight into which values should be taught beyond those 
“necessary to the maintenance of a democratic political system.”2  
Furthermore, judicial interpretations of the Establishment Clause3 of 
the First Amendment have created a separation between church and 
state, which precludes American public schools from teaching or 
promoting any religious values.4  The Court has reserved that right 
for parents.5
Conversely, England has had an established church since the six-
teenth century.6  Under the Education Act of 1944, religious instruc-
 ∗ J.D., 2008, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.S. 2005, Douglass College, 
Rutgers University.  I would like to thank Professors Angela Carmella and Catherine 
McCauliff for their invaluable advice and guidance in writing this Comment. 
 1 Bd. of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 909 (1982) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
 2 Tyll van Geel, Citizenship Education and the Free Exercise of Religion, 34 AKRON L. 
REV. 293, 300 (2000). 
 3 U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law respecting an establish-
ment of religion . . . .”). 
 4 See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962); 
McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948); Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 
(1947); W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943); Minersville Sch. 
Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940). 
 5 See Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534•35 (1925). 
 6 See Act of Uniformity, 1559, 1 Eliz., c. 2 (Eng.), available at http://history 
.hanover.edu/texts/engref/er80.html. 
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tion was mandatory in any primary or secondary school that received 
government funds.7  Although the Act referred to “religion” gener-
ally, it inherently encouraged Christianity and demonstrated a new 
desire to teach children religious values in post-war England.8  The 
inclusion of religion in the Act represented two ideas: first, people 
needed to regain faith in the aftermath of World War II; and second, 
most religions teach some type of moral code, which, if followed, 
might prevent the horrors of a world war from reoccurring.9  Al-
though religion continues to be a part of the national curriculum, a 
majority of schools no longer complies with daily prayer require-
ments, demonstrating that religious practice, though still statutorily 
embedded in British education, has less importance in present-day 
England.10
Although the United States and England diverge regarding relig-
ion’s place in government, the two countries are aligned in their de-
sire to protect an individual’s right to freedom of religion.11  That 
right is frequently invoked in a school setting because some students 
require special religious accommodations.12  In the United States, 
such accommodations or exemptions are permitted only when there 
is no “state interest of sufficient magnitude” overriding the student’s 
interest being asserted under the Free Exercise Clause.13 Similarly, 
England uses a proportionality test created by the European Court of 
Human Rights, whereby courts determine the proportionality of the 
government aim as it relates to the limitation on an individual’s 
 7 A. BRADNEY, RELIGIONS, RIGHTS AND LAWS 61 (1993). 
 8 Id.  For example, the Act required local conferences to create the curricula for 
compulsory religious education, and the Act also mandated that conference mem-
bership include representatives from the Church of England.  Id. 
 9 See id. 
 10 See VERA G. MCEWAN, EDUCATION LAW 131 (2d ed. 1999) (“A survey in 1985 
found that only 6% of maintained secondary schools” engaged in statutorily man-
dated collective worship.). 
 11 Compare U.S. CONST. amend. I, with Act of Uniformity, 1559, 1 Eliz., c. 2 (Eng.), 
available at http://history.hanover.edu/texts/engref/er80.html. See also Council of 
Europe, European Convention on Human Rights § 1, art. 9, Nov. 4, 1950, available at 
http://www.hri.org/docs/ECHR50.html [hereinafter European Convention]. 
 12 See infra Part IV. 
 13 Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 214 (1972).  In Employment Division v. Smith, 
the Supreme Court held that an individual is not exempt from a law of general ap-
plicability unless more than one constitutional right, or a hybrid of rights, is affected.  
494 U.S. 872, 881 (1992).  Thus, religious exemptions in the public school setting are 
still permissible because they involve the right to free exercise, along with the right of 
parents to direct the upbringing of their children.  See infra Part II.C. 
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right.14  Because religion is incorporated in the British government, 
one might infer that the demand for a religious accommodation in a 
public school would present less of a conflict than in the United 
States.  Yet, curiously, courts in the United States, which are bound by 
the rigidity of the U.S. Constitution, are more likely to grant a reli-
gious accommodation than courts in England.  This Comment at-
tempts to show that because religious freedom has existed in the 
United States since its creation, U.S. courts are more sympathetic to 
claims for religious accommodation in public schools. 
Part II of this Comment explains the separation of church and 
state in the United States and the resulting absence of religion from 
American public schools.  Part II also explains the test courts use to 
determine whether an individual is eligible for an exemption.  Part 
III describes the enactments implemented in England which promote 
the protection of an individual’s human rights.  Part III also explains 
how religion and education are intertwined in England.  Finally, Part 
IV compares recent cases from the United States and England to 
show how England, which does not have a Bill of Rights, has the 
flexibility to allow more religious freedom in an educational setting 
but nonetheless enforces democratic ideals at the expense of an indi-
vidual’s rights. 
II. SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE 
IN THE UNITED STATES 
A. Neutrality in American Public Schools 
Unlike England, which openly endorses and funds religious 
education for different religions, the Supreme Court of the United 
States has struggled over the years to interpret the First Amendment’s 
requirement that “Congress shall make no law respecting an estab-
lishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof,”15 espe-
cially in the context of public education.16  This amendment was in-
tended to promote religious freedom while also creating a religiously 
neutral government that neither preferred any religious sect nor 
 14 Christina Kitterman, Comment, The United Kingdom’s Human Rights Act of 1998: 
Will the Parliament Relinquish Its Sovereignty to Ensure Human Rights Protection in Domestic 
Courts?, 7 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 583, 587 (2001) (citing Handyside v. United 
Kingdom, App. No. 5493/72, 1 Eur. H.R. Rep. 737, (1976)). 
 15 U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 16 See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962); 
McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948); Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 
(1947); W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943); Minersville Sch. 
Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940). 
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supported religion over irreligion.17  The Supreme Court has ex-
plained that the Establishment Clause prohibits federal and state 
governments from setting up churches, forcing people to participate 
in religious practices, punishing people based on their religious be-
liefs, using taxes to fund religious programs or institutions, and par-
ticipating in religious organizations.18
Because both the federal and state governments fund and oper-
ate public schools, school policies and programs cannot represent re-
ligious establishment.  The Establishment Clause therefore prohibits 
public schools from providing students with religious instruction.  For 
example, public school programs that allow students to receive reli-
gious instruction at their parents’ option once a week during the 
regular school day are unconstitutional if the program is held on 
school property and takes time away from secular studies.19  These 
programs are not religiously neutral because they are implemented 
by tax-supported public school systems and utilize tax-supported 
property.20  Conversely, a program that releases students early so that 
they may pursue religious instruction elsewhere is constitutional be-
cause such a policy makes no use of public resources and merely ac-
commodates individuals’ religious needs by rearranging their school 
schedules.21
The Court has further held that public schools would violate the 
Establishment Clause if they were to coerce students to support or 
participate in any form of religious exercise.22  In School District v. 
Schempp, the Supreme Court held statutes from Pennsylvania and 
Maryland as unconstitutional because they required that students re-
cite portions of the Bible at the beginning of each school day.23  Simi-
larly, the Supreme Court struck down a New York statute that man-
dated all public school students to recite daily a nondenominational 
prayer written by the State Board of Regents.24  Although these stat-
 17 Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 855 (1995) 
(Thomas, J., concurring). 
 18 Everson, 330 U.S. at 15•16. 
 19 McCollum, 333 U.S at 207, 210. 
 20 Id. at 210. 
 21 Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 314•15 (1952). 
 22 See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 587 (1992) (prohibiting invocation and 
benediction prayers as part of formal public school graduation ceremony); Sch. Dist. 
v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 225–26 (1963) (holding unconstitutional statutes that re-
quire students to read from the Bible during the school day); Engel v. Vitale, 370 
U.S. 421, 424 (1962) (invalidating rule requiring recitation of a morning prayer that 
was created by state officials). 
 23 Schempp, 374 U.S. at 223. 
 24 Engel, 370 U.S. at 424. 
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utes permitted students to abstain from participating in the exercise, 
the use and endorsement of any type of prayer in a public school sys-
tem nonetheless violated the separation of church and state required 
by the Establishment Clause.25  By prohibiting the school-sponsored 
recitation of prayers during the school day, the Establishment Clause 
furthers the constitutional goal of protecting religious freedom by 
disallowing the preference of one religious belief over another.26
In an effort to further isolate public schools from religion, the 
Supreme Court of the United States has held that religious prayers 
are also prohibited at school-sponsored events outside of the class-
room.  In Lee v. Weisman, the Court held that state officials could not 
direct a religious prayer at graduation ceremonies.27  The reasons the 
Court held that the school’s involvement violated the Establishment 
Clause were that (1) a school official decided that an opening invoca-
tion and closing benediction should be given; (2) the school chose a 
clergyman to lead the prayer; and, most importantly, (3) the school 
directed the content of the prayer that would be recited at a manda-
tory school ceremony.28  Once again, the Supreme Court was con-
cerned that the state-sponsored ceremony violated students’ right to 
free exercise by pressuring nonbelievers to participate in a religious 
activity contrary to their own beliefs.29
The Court ultimately opined on the outer boundaries of the Es-
tablishment Clause when it upheld the Equal Access Act of 1984, a 
law which created an exception to the neutrality requirement in pub-
lic schools.30  This Act prohibits federally funded, public secondary 
 25 Id. at 425; see also Schempp, 374 U.S. at 224•25. 
 26 See Engel, 370 U.S. at 431•32. 
 27 Lee, 505 U.S. at 586–87. 
 28 Id. at 587•89. 
 29 Id. at 593. 
 30 The Equal Access Act, 20 U.S.C. § 4071 (2000). 
(a) Restriction of limited open forum on basis of religious, political, 
philosophical, or other speech context prohibited  
It shall be unlawful for any public secondary school which receives 
Federal financial assistance and which has a limited open forum to 
deny equal access or a fair opportunity to, or discriminate against, any 
students who wish to conduct a meeting within that limited open fo-
rum on the basis of the religious, political, philosophical, or other con-
tent of the speech at such meetings. 
(b) “Limited open forum” defined 
A public secondary school has a limited open forum whenever such 
school grants an offering to or opportunity for one or more noncur-
riculum related student groups to meet on school premises during 
noninstructional time. 
(c) Fair opportunity criteria 
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schools from discriminating against students who wish to conduct a 
religious, political, or philosophical meeting on school property dur-
ing non-instructional hours.31  Although faculty may not participate 
in such meetings, their attendance is required.32  In Board of Education 
of Westside Community School v. Mergens,33 the Supreme Court of the 
United States held that the Equal Access Act did not violate the Estab-
lishment Clause because it was more consistent with an “equal access” 
policy than a state system of sponsored religion.34  Additionally, since 
the Act requires that meetings occur during non-instructional time 
and that faculty be present merely to supervise, the Court held that it 
did not create an excessive entanglement of government and relig-
ion.35
B. Funding of Religious Education in the United States 
The United States’s approach to religion in schools further devi-
ates from England’s approach because the Establishment Clause typi-
cally forbids states from providing any type of funding to church-
related schools.36  In England, by contrast, religiously affiliated 
schools receive government funding.  However, case law has gradually 
evolved such that states currently are permitted to disburse funds to 
religious schools under certain circumstances.37  In Everson v. Board of 
Schools shall be deemed to offer a fair opportunity to students who 
wish to conduct a meeting within its limited open forum if such school 
uniformly provides that— 
(1) the meeting is voluntary and student-initiated; 
(2) there is no sponsorship of the meeting by the school, the 
government, or its agents or employees;  
(3) employees or agents of the school or government are pre-
sent at religious meetings only in a nonparticipatory capacity; 
(4) the meeting does not materially and substantially interfere 
with the orderly conduct of educational activities within the 
school; and 
(5) nonschool persons may not direct, conduct, control, or 
regularly attend activities of student groups. 
Id. § 4071(a), (b), (c). 
 31 Id. § 4071(a), (b). 
 32 Id. § 4071(c)(3). 
 33 496 U.S. 226 (1990). 
 34 Id. at 250•53. 
 35 Id. at 253. 
 36 See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971) (citing Walz v. Tax Comm’n 
of N.Y., 397 U.S. 664, 668 (1970)). 
 37 See Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002) (no violation of the Estab-
lishment Clause where states provide parents with funding to send their children to 
public or private schools and parents privately choose where their children will at-
tend school); Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000) (allowing federal government 
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Education,38 the Supreme Court addressed the constitutionality of a 
New Jersey local school board policy of reimbursing parents for using 
public transportation buses to send their children to school.39  Pursu-
ant to this policy, parents received funds irrespective of whether their 
children attended public or Catholic parochial schools.40  While ac-
knowledging the wall of separation between church and state, the 
Supreme Court upheld the policy because it applied to all people 
generally, regardless of their religious beliefs.41  It was, therefore, 
“neutral in its relations with groups of religious believers and non-
believers.”42
In Lemon v. Kurtzman,43 the Supreme Court developed a three-
pronged test to determine whether statutes granting funding for 
education in religiously affiliated schools violate the Establishment 
Clause.44  To survive constitutional scrutiny, a “statute must have a 
secular legislative purpose . . . , its principal or primary effect must be 
one that neither advances nor inhibits religion . . . , [and it] must not 
foster ‘an excessive government entanglement with religion.’”45  A 
finding of excessive entanglement is based on “the character and pur-
poses of the institutions that are benefited, the nature of the aid that 
the State provides, and the resulting relationship between the gov-
ernment and the religious authority.”46  The statutes at issue in 
Lemon, however, did not survive constitutional scrutiny because the 
Supreme Court concluded that the funding programs constituted an 
“excessive entanglement between government and religion.”47
To help low-achieving children meet state performance stan-
dards, Congress enacted Title I of the Elementary and Secondary 
Education Act of 1965 (“Title I”), which provides additional funding 
to provide religiously affiliated schools with aid where such aid is used to purchase 
educational materials and equipment); Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947) 
(holding that school board could reimburse parents for transportation expenses in-
curred when sending children to school regardless of whether children attended 
public or private parochial schools because statute applied generally regardless of 
religious belief). 
 38 330 U.S. 1. 
 39 Id. at 3. 
 40 Id. 
 41 Id. at 18. 
 42 Id. 
 43 403 U.S. 602 (1971). 
 44 Id. at 612–13. 
 45 Id. (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm’n of N.Y., 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970)). 
 46 Id. at 615. 
 47 Id. at 614. 
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to local educational agencies (LEAs).48  Student eligibility does not 
depend on whether the child goes to a public or a private school, but 
rather on the character of the benefits provided by the funding: to 
qualify, the benefits must be “secular, neutral, and nonideological.”49
The use of this aid has raised various Establishment Clause is-
sues.50  In Agostini v. Felton,51 the Board of Education of the City of 
New York, along with a group of parents, sought relief from an in-
junction preventing Title I teachers from providing aid to students in 
religious private schools.52  After concluding that Title I teachers 
could work in religious private schools because their presence neither 
promoted nor inhibited religion, the Supreme Court also held that 
the “excessive entanglement” analysis and the “impermissible effect” 
analysis were essentially the same.53  Thus, the Supreme Court elimi-
nated the entanglement factor of the Lemon test,54 making only the 
first two Lemon factors relevant to the school aid question.55  Notably, 
the Supreme Court acknowledged that some interaction or entan-
glement between the church and the state is inevitable.56  By allowing 
children to receive necessary aid for secular subjects in religious 
schools, the Supreme Court promoted the right to free exercise be-
 48 20 U.S.C. § 6312(a)–(b) (2000).  The LEA must apply to its state education 
agency for federal funds.  Id. § 6312(e).  The LEA must create a plan describing the 
programs it will implement to meet the special education needs of children from 
low-income families.  Id.  The state education agency must approve the plan before 
the LEA receives any funding.  Id. § 6312(e)(2). 
 49 Id. § 6320(a)(2). 
 50 Aguilar v. Felton established an automatic presumption of excessive entangle-
ment of government and religion when federally funded services are provided inside 
a parochial school.  473 U.S. 402, 412•14 (1985).  As a result of the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Aguilar, the New York Legislature enacted a statute creating a separate 
school district for a small orthodox Jewish village.  Bd. of Educ. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 
687, 692•93 (1994).  Because village residents did not want their children attending 
schools outside of the community, the creation of a separate school district allowed 
them to open a publicly funded special education school inside the village.  Id. at 
694.  Eligible children could then receive benefits.  Id.  While acknowledging the 
state’s right to accommodate religious needs, the Supreme Court found that this 
statute conferred benefits on a religious sect in a non-neutral manner and was there-
fore unconstitutional.  Id. at 704•05. 
 51 521 U.S. 203 (1997). 
 52 Id. at 212–14.  After the Supreme Court held in Aguilar that the Board’s Title I 
program violated the Establishment Clause, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern 
District of New York ordered an injunction, which remained in effect until the Su-
preme Court handed down its opinion in Agostini twelve years later.  Id. at 208•09. 
 53 Id. at 232. 
 54 Id. at 233. 
 55 Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 807 (2000). 
 56 Agostini, 521 U.S. at 233. 
KASS (FINAL) 12/1/2008  12:42:49 PM 
2008] COMMENT 1513 
 
cause parents were able to send their children to any school without 
worrying that their children would be denied these benefits.57
In Mitchell v. Helms,58 which involved a program similar to that in 
Agostini, the Supreme Court focused its decision on neutrality and 
private choice.59  The Court held that as long as the state offers aid 
“to a broad range of groups or persons without regard to their relig-
ion,” then the program is neutral and religious indoctrination is not 
attributable to the state.60  The Court further held that an individual 
who qualifies for aid through a neutral program has the private right 
to choose where he or she wants to go to school.61  Such a decision 
cannot be attributed to the state.62  Similarly, in Zelman v. Simmons-
Harris,63 the Supreme Court upheld an Ohio voucher program that 
provided parents with monetary grants to send their children to any 
school, public or private—even religious—within the Cleveland City 
School District.64  Because the program was one of true private 
choice, the Supreme Court held that it was entirely neutral toward re-
ligion.65
Claims regarding violations of the Establishment Clause based 
on the distribution of aid often occur in impoverished areas where a 
large number of students attend religiously affiliated private schools 
which offer a better education than local public schools.66  To enjoy 
fully the freedoms guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution, children 
from these underprivileged areas need the best education possible.67  
Without education, these children would never be able to participate 
effectively in democratic society.68  Opponents of programs that pro-
vide aid equally to both public and private schools focus on the for-
mal concerns of the Establishment Clause.69  They ignore the fact 
that education provided in these failing school districts is not really 
comparable to public education elsewhere and deny these students 
 57 Id. at 213.  Due to the increased costs associated with modifying the Title I pro-
gram to comply with the terms of the injunction, fewer students were receiving bene-
fits from Title I funding.  Id. 
 58 530 U.S. at 793. 
 59 Id. at 810–11. 
 60 Id. at 809. 
 61 Id. at 811. 
 62 Id. 
 63 536 U.S. 639 (2002). 
 64 Id. at 645•46, 653. 
 65 Id. at 653. 
 66 See id. at 681•82 (Thomas, J., concurring); Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 830. 
 67 Zelman, 536 U.S. at 681•82 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 68 Id. 
 69 Id. 
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the equal protection guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.70  
Although the opinions in Mitchell and Zelman focus on the need to 
educate children in impoverished areas, these decisions nonetheless 
promote the right to free exercise because children will not be de-
nied an education based on their choice of a religious school. 
C. Exemptions for Free Exercise from Generally Applicable Rules 
Sometimes laws that apply to the general population conflict 
with an individual’s religious beliefs, infringing on his or her right to 
free exercise, and courts are subsequently required to resolve the dis-
pute, either ruling in favor of an orderly society or affirming the indi-
vidual’s fundamental rights.  In Wisconsin v. Yoder, the Supreme Court 
of the United States upheld the First Amendment rights of Amish 
children whose religious beliefs conflicted with a state statute requir-
ing them to attend public or private school until the age of sixteen.71  
The parents of several children were convicted of violating the statute 
when they refused to send their children to school after the children 
completed the eighth grade.72  The parents argued that the statute 
infringed upon their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights be-
cause sending their children to high school directly conflicted with 
the Amish religion and lifestyle.73
The Supreme Court held that Wisconsin could not compel 
school attendance against a claim of religious interference unless the 
requirement on its face did not impede the free exercise of religion 
or the state’s interest was compelling enough to exceed protection of 
the individual’s First Amendment right.74  The Supreme Court 
agreed that Wisconsin had an undeniable interest in educating chil-
dren but said that the state’s interest in education was not automati-
cally superior to other interests because “only those interests of the 
highest order and those not otherwise served can overbalance legiti-
mate claims to the free exercise of religion.”75
When balancing the importance of the various interests, the Su-
preme Court considered the genuineness of the parents’ claims and 
emphasized the difference between mere personal preference and 
sincere religious belief, concluding that the parents’ claims in Yoder 
 70 Id. 
 71 Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 207 (1972). 
 72 Id. 
 73 Id. at 208•09. 
 74 Id. at 214. 
 75 Id. at 214•15. 
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were religiously grounded.76  The Supreme Court found that the Wis-
consin statute severely impeded the Amish children’s free exercise of 
religion because their religion, which has existed for centuries, is 
founded upon a simple lifestyle that ignores advances in technology, 
along with current societal norms, and instead focuses on devotion to 
God, family, and community.77  Forcing Amish children to attend 
public high school would compromise their religious beliefs by ex-
posing them to values contrary to their own and to excessive pressure 
from their peers to conform.78
The Supreme Court then noted that certain religiously moti-
vated behavior could be subject to regulations of general applicability 
intended “to promote the health, safety, and general welfare” of the 
public.79  The state argued that it had a strong interest in creating 
self-sufficient individuals capable of intelligently participating in soci-
ety, but the Supreme Court did not agree that this interest was com-
pelling enough to infringe upon the Amish beliefs.80  The Amish 
people were already a self-sufficient community that had existed for 
hundreds of years; one or two extra years of education would have lit-
tle beneficial effect on their lives.81  Because the Amish parents did 
not jeopardize the health or well-being of their children, the Su-
preme Court further explained that the right of the parents to direct 
the upbringing of their children, in conjunction with their First 
Amendment right to exercise religion freely, outweighed the state’s 
“compelling” interest.82  The Supreme Court concluded that the First 
and Fourteenth Amendments prevented the state from requiring the 
Amish to send their children to public high schools, essentially ex-
empting the Amish people from the rule.83
In Employment Division v. Smith,84 the Supreme Court distin-
guished its rule regarding laws of general applicability from the bal-
ancing test established in Yoder.  In Smith, two individuals were dis-
charged from their jobs after they ingested peyote during a Native 
 76 Id. at 215•16. 
 77 Yoder, 406 U.S. at 210. 
 78 Id. at 217•18. 
 79 Id. at 220. 
 80 Id. at 221. 
 81 Id. at 222. 
 82 Id. at 233•34. 
 83 Yoder, 406 U.S. at 234•35. 
 84 494 U.S. 872 (1992).  Although Smith did not involve a claim for an exemption 
arising from a student in a public school setting, the holding still affects students re-
quiring religious accommodations. 
KASS (FINAL) 12/1/2008  12:42:49 PM 
1516 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 38:1505 
 
American religious ceremony.85  The use of the peyote violated an 
Oregon law which prohibited the possession of certain controlled 
substances.86  The Supreme Court considered whether the prohibi-
tion of the religious use of peyote violated the Free Exercise Clause.87
The Supreme Court refused to exempt the individuals from the 
Oregon law because it was a neutral, generally applicable law not in-
tended to promote or oppress any religious beliefs.88  To maintain an 
orderly, democratic society, states must be permitted to regulate and 
citizens must abide by certain laws.89  The Supreme Court explained 
that the holding in Yoder, which allows the court to use a compelling 
interest test, applied only because that case involved a “hybrid” or a 
combination of constitutional rights—the right to free exercise and 
the right to direct the upbringing of one’s children.90  This conclu-
sion supports the idea that two claims involving infringements of con-
stitutional rights, which would fail if alleged separately, have the po-
tential to succeed when they are asserted as a combination because 
the hybrid of constitutional rights triggers the compelling interest 
test.91
 85 Id. at 874. 
 86 Id. 
 87 Id. at 876.  After the two individuals lost their jobs, they applied for unem-
ployment, and the Employment Division denied their request for benefits because 
they were discharged for misconduct.  Id. at 874.  The Oregon Court of Appeals re-
versed that decision, holding that it violated the employees’ right to free exercise of 
religion.  Id.  The Supreme Court of Oregon reversed again.  Id. at 875.  The Su-
preme Court of the United States remanded the case so that the Supreme Court of 
Oregon could decide whether peyote was included within the Oregon statute as a 
controlled substance.  Id.  The Supreme Court of Oregon held that peyote was in-
cluded in the statute but that the employees’ First Amendment rights were violated.  
Id. at 876.  The Employment Division appealed.  Id. 
 88 Id. at 879 (citing Minersville Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 
594•95 (1940)). 
 89 Id. at 879. 
 90 Smith, 494 U.S. at 881. 
 91 William L. Esser, Note, Religious Hybrids in the Lower Courts:  Free Exercise Plus or 
Constitutional Smokescreen?, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 211, 218•19 (1998).  But see 
Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 567 (1993) 
(Souter, J., concurring): 
[T]he distinction Smith draws strikes me as ultimately untenable. If a 
hybrid claim is simply one in which another constitutional right is im-
plicated, then the hybrid exception would probably be so vast as to 
swallow the Smith rule, and, indeed, the hybrid exception would cover 
the situation exemplified by Smith, since free speech and associational 
rights are certainly implicated in the peyote ritual. But if a hybrid claim 
is one in which a litigant would actually obtain an exemption from a 
formally neutral, generally applicable law under another constitutional 
provision, then there would have been no reason for the Court in what 
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III. ESTABLISHED RELIGION IN ENGLAND 
A. History of Religious Freedom in England 
The 1559 Act of Uniformity established the Church of England 
as the national religion.92  Despite the Anglican establishment, Eng-
land has worked vigorously to protect religious freedom for all relig-
ions.93  While the Church of England may appear to be the preferred 
religion, today England tolerates all minority faiths and guarantees 
them freedom of worship and the freedom to practice their religion 
in public.94  Additionally, the functions of the Church do not coin-
cide with the functions of public government.95  The House of Lords 
recently held that, under the Human Rights Act of 1998, the Church 
of England is not a “public authority.”96
England does not have a written constitution or a bill of rights 
like the United States, but the common law and statutes tend to pro-
tect civil liberties.97  Additionally, England adheres to the European 
Convention on Human Rights of 1950 (“Convention”).98  The Euro-
pean Council, which was formed after the conclusion of World War 
II, enacted the Convention to protect various fundamental freedoms 
and rights.99  Article 9 of the Convention states: 
(1) Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and 
religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or be-
lief, and freedom, either alone or in community with others and 
in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief, in worship, 
teaching, practice and observance.   
(2) Freedom to manifest one’s religion or beliefs shall be subject 
only to such limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary 
in a democratic society in the interests of public safety, for the 
Smith calls the hybrid cases to have mentioned the Free Exercise Clause 
at all. 
Id. 
 92 Act of Uniformity, 1559, 1 Eliz., c. 2 (Eng.), available at http://history.hanover 
.edu/texts/engref/er80.html. 
 93 Richard Albert, American Separationism and Liberal Democracy: The Establishment 
Clause in Historical and Comparative Perspective, 88 MARQ. L. REV. 867, 917 (2005). 
 94 Id. 
 95 Rex Ahdar & Ian Leigh, Is Establishment Consistent with Religious Freedom?, 49 
MCGILL L.J. 635, 639 (2004). 
 96 Id. 
 97 Albert, supra note 93, at 918. 
 98 European Convention, supra note 11. 
 99 Kitterman, supra note 14, at 584•85. 
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protection of public order, health or morals, or the protection of 
the rights and freedoms of others.100
Another relevant provision of the Convention is Article 2 of Protocol 
1, which states: 
No person shall be denied the right to education. In the exercise 
of any functions which it assumes in relation to education and to 
teaching, the State shall respect the right of parents to ensure 
such education and teaching in conformity with their own relig-
ions and philosophical convictions.101
The United Kingdom incorporated the Convention into its do-
mestic law when it enacted the Human Rights Act of 1998.102  The 
Human Rights Act allows British citizens to bring claims of human 
rights violations directly before British courts.103  British courts inter-
pret current legislation so that it conforms to the Convention.104  
Opinions from the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg 
help guide British decisions, but they are not binding.105
B. Education in England 
Religious schools in England and Wales are found in both the 
private sector and a predominant part of the public sector.106  Eng-
land funds both types of schools.107  In contrast to American schools, 
which are governed by state and local rules, educational standards in 
England are governed by Parliamentary legislation.108
Modern education law in England and Wales was developed 
through various legislative acts beginning with the Education Act 
 100 European Convention, supra note 11. 
 101 Council of Europe, Protocol 1 to the European Convention on Human Rights 
art. 2, Mar. 20, 1952, available at http://www.hri.org/docs/ECHR50.html. 
 102 Ariel Bendor & Zeev Segal, Constitutionalism and Trust in Britain: An Ancient 
Constitutional Culture, a New Judicial Review Model, 17 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 683, 685 
(2002). 
 103 Kitterman, supra note 14, at 589. 
 104 Id. at 592. 
 105 Id. at 591.  Individuals who reside in countries that adhere to the Convention 
can bring claims of human rights violations directly to the European Court of Hu-
man Rights, whose decisions are binding on member countries.  Id. at 585•86.  If a 
British court cannot provide an adequate remedy, then individuals still can bring 
their claims before the European Court of Human Rights.  Id. at 594. 
 106 C.M.A. McCauliff, Distant Mirror or Preview of Our Future: Does Locke v. Davey 
Prevent American Use of Creative English Financing for Religious Schools?, 29 VT. L. REV. 
365, 375 (2005). 
 107 Id. 
 108 Id. at 380•81. 
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1944.109  The 1944 Act created a new system of education in post-war 
England.110  A frequently litigated provision of the 1944 Act, which 
will be demonstrated in one of the cases below,111 requires an LEA to 
provide students with transportation to and from school.112  This pro-
vision created many conflicts because the 1944 Act also granted par-
ents the right to choose which school their children would attend, 
and sometimes a preferred school was located far away.113
Under the 1944 Act, an LEA “w[as] obliged . . . to have regard to 
parental preference,” but the Education Act 1980 made it a manda-
tory requirement for an LEA to comply with a parent’s request.114  
The Education Reform Act 1988 further advanced parental rights 
and preferences by giving them greater choices regarding where their 
children would attend school, influence over the governing bodies, 
and control of certain types of schools.115  A parent will usually prefer 
one school over another for religious reasons.116  The Education Act 
1996 repealed the earlier Acts to consolidate all of the modern law, 
and the Education Act 1998 established the current structure of 
schools.117
There are five main types of schools in England: maintained, 
community, voluntary, independent, and foundation schools.118  Un-
der the 1944 Act, an LEA was required to provide “a variety of educa-
tion for children of compulsory school age.”119  LEAs own both main-
tained and community schools.120  Voluntary schools, which are only 
assisted rather than owned by LEAs, receive various amounts of gov-
ernment funding and usually serve a particular religious persua-
sion.121  These schools are often started by groups who believe that 
the government’s educational guidelines are inconsistent with their 
own religious beliefs but who cannot afford to finance a private 
 109 MCEWAN, supra note 10, at 3–5.  This Comment does not discuss the majority 
of these acts because most of them focused on a specific aspect of the education sys-
tem in England not relevant to the topic of this Comment.  Id. 
 110 Id. at 3. 
 111 See infra Part IV.E. 
 112 MCEWAN, supra note 10, at 4. 
 113 Id. 
 114 Id. at 5. 
 115 Id. 
 116 BRADNEY, supra note 7, at 65. 
 117 MCEWAN, supra note 10, at 6•7. 
 118 Id. at 16•22. 
 119 Id. at 16. 
 120 Id. at 16•17. 
 121 Id. at 19. 
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school independently.122  Although any religious school can apply for 
voluntary-aided status, it has been argued that the system inherently 
discriminates, as Muslim applications have consistently been turned 
down on procedural or technical grounds.123
Independent schools are the equivalent of American private 
schools.124  Independent schools maintain private contracts with stu-
dents and are therefore not subject to judicial review.125  A significant 
number of independent schools serve religious traditions that have 
only recently arrived in Great Britain, such as Islam and Judaism.126  
Criticism of the curricula and teachers at independent schools, how-
ever, has made it difficult for religious groups to set up such schools 
in their communities.127
Curricula in England and Wales are mostly secular.128  With the 
exception of independent schools, the government requires all 
schools in England and Wales to implement a national curriculum.129  
Under the 1998 Act, a daily act of worship is still required in all 
schools (with an exception again for independent schools), but re-
ports have shown that less than seventy percent of schools comply 
with the requirement.130  Religious education, however, continues to 
be a part of the basic curriculum.131
The British government intentionally wove Christianity into 
education law.132  Since the enactment of the 1944 Act, people have 
gradually drifted away from religion.133  When the British government 
enacted the 1988 Act, Parliament consciously placed Christian educa-
tion at the center of all religious education.134  In fact, the 1988 Act 
was the first time Parliament explicitly mentioned “Christianity” in a 
provision of education legislation.135  British law, however, does not 
 122 BRADNEY, supra note 7, at 67. 
 123 Id. at 68.  One Muslim school was not large enough for voluntary status.  Id. 
 124 See MCEWAN, supra note 10, at 20. 
 125 Id. (citing R v. Headmaster of Fernhill Manor Sch., ex parte Brown [1993] 1 
FLR 620. (1992)). 
 126 BRADNEY, supra note 7, at 69. 
 127 Id. at 70. 
 128 See MCEWAN, supra note 10, at 123•24.  In the national curriculum, the three 
core subjects are English, math, and science.  Id.  Other subjects include “history, ge-
ography, technology, music, art, physical education, and a modern language.”  Id. 
 129 Id. at 124. 
 130 Id. at 131. 
 131 Id. 
 132 BRADNEY, supra note 7, at 60. 
 133 Id. at 65. 
 134 Id. 
 135 Id. 
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specifically limit religious schools to Christianity; currently there are a 
small number of Jewish and Muslim schools as well.136  Although the 
educational trend in Great Britain is toward freedom of religion and 
individual autonomy, modern legislation, particularly the 1988 Act, 
indoctrinates children with Christian beliefs because such legislation 
teaches children that Christianity represents community values.137
Thus, the predominant absence of religion from American pub-
lic schools, which is the result of the First Amendment’s prohibition 
of establishment, tends to promote more religious freedom than the 
British system.138  In contrast to British education, which has legisla-
tively and in practice endorsed Christianity as the core faith, Ameri-
can education, which supports no religious beliefs, effectively treats 
all religions equally from the beginning.  As religious exceptions or 
accommodations are necessary, courts have the ability to grant them 
to protect the individual’s right to free exercise.139
IV. RECENT CASES 
England continues to have an established religion.  After Amer-
ica won its freedom from England, its founders did not want to create 
a nation that fostered the same type of religious establishment.  Thus, 
the Establishment Clause was included in the Bill of Rights, formally 
prohibiting established religion.  “Establishment[, however,] is, in 
fact, consistent with religious freedom . . . .  Even if a state does not 
have an established church, it will have an established position on re-
ligion.  A secular, liberal state is not ‘neutral’.  It tolerates religions 
on its own terms.”140  Although England still has an established 
church, the United States and England both encourage religious 
freedom.  The Bill of Rights automatically grants American citizens 
the right to free exercise of religion, and the courts then decide at 
what point that right should be curtailed for the sake of maintaining 
a civilized society.  Conversely, British courts, which are not bound by 
a Bill of Rights, have the liberty to grant additional rights as they are 
requested.  As in the United States, however, rights can be denied for 
the sake of maintaining order. 
As the following cases will show, the United States tends to be 
slightly more tolerant in the classroom because the American method 
 136 Id. at 67. 
 137 Id. at 71.  This is the opposite of the American goal to prevent religious indoc-
trination in public schools. 
 138 See supra Part II.A. 
 139 See supra Part II.C. 
 140 Ahdar & Leigh, supra note 95, at 637. 
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focuses on the rights of the individual, while England’s focus is the 
availability or lack of alternatives to the circumstances creating the 
problem.  Because all of the British cases involve parents enforcing 
religious rights in a school setting, this Comment compares them us-
ing the Yoder analysis, which requires a court to examine a combina-
tion of rights.  Yet in either country accommodation will sometimes 
be denied for the sake of some compelling government interest. 
A. Hicks v. Halifax County Board of Education141
In this U.S. case, the plaintiff sued the defendant school district, 
claiming that the district’s mandatory uniform policy was unconstitu-
tional because the policy did not contain any provisions permitting 
students to “opt-out” for religious reasons.142  The plaintiff filed a 
complaint after her great-grandson was suspended from school for 
not complying with a new uniform policy.143  The great-grandmother 
stated that the policy infringed upon her right to free exercise and 
her right, as her great-grandson’s legal guardian, to direct his up-
bringing.144  More specifically, the grandmother believed that com-
pelling students to wear uniforms eliminates an individual’s free will 
and is “characteristic of the ‘last days’ and required by the anti-
Christ.”145  As such, her religion required her to oppose the anti-
Christ and prevent her children from becoming indoctrinated with 
his orders and his mark.146
The district court explained that the circumstances of this case 
could fall under the hybrid-rights exemption demonstrated by Yoder, 
and that the plaintiff was therefore entitled to strict scrutiny review of 
the uniform policy.147  Notably, this opinion denied only the defen-
dant’s motion for summary judgment; the court did not resolve the 
issue on its merits.148  In its reasoning, the court emphasized the al-
ready established right of parents to direct the upbringing of their 
children149 and stated that the Supreme Court of the United States 
has protected religious beliefs under the First Amendment even 
 141 93 F. Supp. 2d 649 (E.D.N.C. 1999). 
 142 Id. at 652. 
 143 Id. at 654. 
 144 Id. at 657. 
 145 Id. at 653. 
 146 Id. at 653•54. 
 147 Hicks, 93 F. Supp. 2d at 663. 
 148 Id. at 663. 
 149 Id. at 658 (citing Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997); Meyer v. 
Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923); Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925)). 
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when such beliefs are not “acceptable, logical, consistent, or compre-
hensible to others.”150
However, applying the balancing test from Yoder, a court would 
have to compare the sincerity of the religious beliefs with the gov-
ernment interest.  In Yoder, the court partially based this determina-
tion on the established history of the Amish religion and its tradi-
tions.151  While there is no subsequent history to Hicks, one can 
predict that it would likely lose on its merits.  Although the uniform 
policy may have imposed some burden on the grandmother’s rights, 
a court could easily conclude that the Board of Education had a com-
pelling interest in creating a uniform policy.  Specifically, the Board 
stated that the policy had the following benefits: “1) improved stu-
dent behavior, 2) increased safety in schools, 3) increased sense of 
belonging and school pride among students, 4) increased emphasis 
on individual personality and achievement rather than outward ap-
pearance among students, and 5) elimination of negative distinctions 
between wealthy and needy children.”152  Moreover, the Board spoke 
to local parents with various religious affiliations who all stated that a 
uniform policy would not violate their religious beliefs.153  The Board 
knew that the plaintiff was opposed to the policy, but the Board could 
not understand how its policy offended the plaintiff’s religion,154 in-
dicating that the burden on the plaintiff’s religious beliefs may not 
have been substantial enough to permit a religious exemption. 
B. Cheema v. Thompson155
In Cheema, another U.S. case, three Khalsa Sikh children brought 
suit against the defendant school district because a policy banning 
students from bringing weapons to school infringed upon the stu-
dents’ right to free exercise of religion under the Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act (RFRA).156  One of the tenets of the Sikh religion re-
 150 Id. at 657 (citing Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 
707, 714 (1981). 
 151 See supra Part II.C. 
 152 Hicks, 93 F. Supp. 2d at 652. 
 153 Id. at 653. 
 154 Id. 
 155 67 F.3d 883 (9th Cir. 1995). 
 156 Id. at 884•85.  RFRA states in relevant part: 
(a)  In general.  Government shall not substantially burden a person’s 
exercise of religion even if the burden results from a rule of general 
applicability, except as provided in subsection (b). 
(b)  Exception.  Government may substantially burden a person’s exer-
cise of religion only if it demonstrates that application of the burden to 
the person— 
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quired the students to carry a “kirpan,” or ceremonial knife on their 
person at all times.157  Because the children demonstrated that carry-
ing a kirpan was part of a sincerely held religious belief and that the 
school policy substantially burdened their religious beliefs, the bur-
den then shifted to the school board to demonstrate that the prohibi-
tion of the kirpans served a compelling state interest.158  After the 
school board failed to establish its burden, the U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the Ninth Circuit upheld a preliminary injunction granted by the 
district court allowing the students to continue wearing their knives 
to school.159
Notably, the court of appeals, like the district court in Hicks, did 
not rule on the merits; rather, the court held that the plaintiffs have 
demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits.160  The court 
seemed to punish the school district for not pleading enough facts 
and refrained from deciding whether the government interest out-
weighed the children’s First Amendment rights.  In this respect, the 
dissenting opinion, which opposed the terms of the injunction,161 is 
more persuasive because it emphasized the danger in allowing stu-
dents to carry knives to school and the importance of maintaining a 
safe environment in schools.162  The dissent explained that, although 
the kirpan may have spiritual meaning to the Sikhs, it is still a knife 
and the Sikh religion dictates that it be used for self-defense pur-
poses.163  The evidence also showed that on several occasions the 
plaintiff children removed their knives from the sheaths; should we 
therefore assume that young Sikh children understand the purpose 
of the kirpan or are capable of assessing the type of situation that 
(1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and 
(2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling 
governmental interest. 
Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1 (2006).  The dissent in 
Cheema notes that Congress enacted these provisions as a response to the Supreme 
Court decision in Smith, which refused to grant individuals exemptions to laws of 
general applicability.  Cheema, 67 F.3d at 888•89.  The Supreme Court of the United 
States invalidated the statute several years later in City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 
(1997). 
 157 Cheema, 67 F.3d at 884.  The knife has a steel blade, approximately seven inches 
long and more than three inches wide.  Id. 
 158 Id. at 885. 
 159 Id. 
 160 Id. 
 161 The dissent expressed concern about the fact that the injunction only required 
the kirpan be sewn, instead of riveted, to the sheath, which would still enable Sikh 
children to remove the kirpan from the sheath.  Id. at 888. 
 162 Cheema, 67 F.3d at 889•90. 
 163 Id. at 890. 
KASS (FINAL) 12/1/2008  12:42:49 PM 
2008] COMMENT 1525 
 
warrants self-defense?164  Cheema provides a good example of circum-
stances where there are foreseeable risks associated with accommo-
dating a student’s religious beliefs, but a Yoder analysis nonetheless 
would likely protect those religious beliefs. 
C. Sherr v. Northport–East Northport Union Free  
School District165
In Sherr, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New 
York considered the validity of a school policy requiring certain im-
munizations unless the students were “bona fide members of a rec-
ognized religious organization.”166  Two families objected to the im-
munization of their children for religious reasons and were denied 
an exemption because they did not belong to a recognized religious 
organization.167  The district court recognized the compelling gov-
ernment interest in mandatory inoculations but ultimately held that 
by limiting the exemption to members of a recognized religion the 
provision was unconstitutional because it preferred some religions 
over others and prevented individuals from the free exercise of relig-
ion, violating the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause 
respectively.168  The district court then concluded that both plaintiffs 
offered religious reasons for requesting an exemption.169  The court 
held, however, that only one of the two plaintiffs held sincere reli-
gious beliefs and, therefore, only one plaintiff was entitled to an ex-
emption from the vaccination rule.170
One should note that Hicks, Cheema, and Sherr all involve indi-
viduals who identify with religions represented by a small percentage 
of the American population.  Clearly laws are less likely to conflict 
with the religious beliefs of individuals who are represented by a ma-
jority.  For example, if a majority of American people were required 
to carry knives for religious reasons, such a practice would likely be 
the societal norm and students would not need an exception to the 
rule.  As the following cases show, the circumstances are similar in 
England; however, England will not grant exemptions unless there is 
no viable alternative. 
 164 Id. at 890•91. 
 165 672 F. Supp. 81 (E.D.N.Y. 1987). 
 166 Id. at 87. 
 167 Id. at 88. 
 168 Id. at 89•91. 
 169 Id. at 93•94. 
 170 Id. at 96•97.  One of the plaintiffs admitted to joining a religious group with 
the sole purpose of obtaining an exemption.  Id. 
KASS (FINAL) 12/1/2008  12:42:49 PM 
1526 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 38:1505 
 
D. R v. Head Teacher & Governors of Denbigh High School171
Denbigh High School is in a “maintained secondary community 
school” that educates students aged eleven through sixteen.172  The 
school has students from twenty-one different ethnic groups, but the 
majority of students is Muslim.173  The majority of the school officials 
is also Muslim, including the head teacher, Yasmin Bevan.174
“The head teacher believes that school uniform plays an integral 
part in securing high and improving standards, serving the needs of a 
diverse community, promoting a positive sense of communal identity 
and avoiding manifest disparities of wealth and style.”175  One of the 
uniform options, the shalwar kameeze, was approved by imams from 
local mosques as an appropriate form of modest dress for Muslim 
girls.176  The school governors also approved certain headscarves.177
Shabina was a Muslim girl and her family chose this particular 
school even though it was outside of her school district.178  She knew 
about the dress code prior to entering the school, and she wore the 
uniform for two years before asking if she could wear a long coat-like 
garment called a jilbab, which covered “the contours of the female 
body.”179  The assistant head teacher refused the request and sent 
Shabina home.180  After that incident, the head teacher sent a letter 
home stating that the student was required to attend school in the 
appropriate uniform and that the Education Welfare Services (EWS) 
would be notified if she failed to attend school.181
The student claimed that the head teacher, the governors, and 
the LEA violated her human rights under the United Kingdom and 
European human rights law discussed above.182  Opinions were then 
gathered from various imams regarding the appropriate dress for 
Muslim girls.183  Some stated that the shalwar kameeze did not pro-
vide the appropriate amount of coverage and others said that it was 
 171 (2006) UKHL 15, (2006) All ER 487. 
 172 Id. ¶ 3. 
 173 Id. 
 174 Id. ¶ 5. 
 175 Id. ¶ 6. 
 176 Id. ¶ 7. 
 177 Denbigh High School, ¶ 7. 
 178 Id. ¶ 9•10. 
 179 Id. 
 180 Id. ¶ 10. 
 181 Id. ¶ 11. 
 182 Id. ¶ 12. 
 183 Denbigh High School, ¶ 13. 
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acceptable.184  The head teacher “felt that adherence to the school 
uniform policy was necessary to promote inclusion and social cohe-
sion, fearing that new variants would encourage the formation of 
groups or cliques identified by their clothing . . . . The school uni-
form had been designed to avoid the development of sub-groups 
identified by dress.”185
The student further claimed that Denbigh High School limited 
her right to her religion or her beliefs under Article 9 of the Euro-
pean Convention for the Protection of Human Rights of 1950, and 
denied her the right to education under Article 2 of the First Proto-
col of the Convention.186  Judge Bennett rejected Shabina’s claims at 
the first trial.187  The Court of Appeal reversed the decision and the 
head teacher and the governors of Denbigh High School appealed.188  
Lord Bingham of Cornhill stated that Article 9 “protects both the 
right to hold a belief, which is absolute, and a right to manifest belief, 
which is qualified.”189  The student in this case had a sincere religious 
belief, even if that belief changed as she matured.190
Not all acts motivated by religious belief will be protected by Ar-
ticle 9.  Such a determination depends on the circumstances of the 
case.  In an employment context, the European Court of Human 
Rights will not find an interference with one’s right to manifest reli-
gious beliefs when a person voluntarily accepts employment that does 
not accommodate a specific religious practice and there are alterna-
tive options that do not present undue hardship or inconvenience.191  
One case from Greece stated that Article 9 did not grant a Jehovah’s 
Witness an exemption from a disciplinary rule that required students 
to participate in a National Parade, when the rule was applied gener-
ally and in a neutral manner.192  Because the student in Denbigh 
chose a school that was outside of her district, she knew about the 
uniform policy before she started attending, and there were three 
other schools in the area which permitted the wearing of the jilbab, 
 184 Id. ¶ 17. 
 185 Id. ¶ 18. 
 186 Id. ¶ 1. 
 187 Id. 
 188 Id. 
 189 Denbigh High School, ¶ 36 (citing Christian Educ. S. Afr. v. Minister of Educ., 
(2000) 9 BHRC 53 at 70). 
 190 Id. ¶ 36. 
 191 Id. ¶ 23. 
 192 Id. 
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Lord Bingham concluded that there was no interference with the 
right to manifest religious beliefs.193
To be justified, an interference must be prescribed by law and 
necessary for a specific democratic purpose.194  A school uniform pol-
icy is not necessarily law, but it is prescribed by the school for a spe-
cific purpose.195  Therefore, the school was justified in its actions and 
did not need to change its uniform policy.196
Additionally, “Article 9 does not require that one should be al-
lowed to manifest one’s religion at any time and place of one’s own 
choosing.”197  Lord Hoffmann stated that the student could have 
gone to another school even though there would have been some in-
convenience and, consequently, there was no infringement on the 
student’s rights under Article 9.198  There is a statutory duty to pro-
vide education, but not at any school the individual chooses.199  Par-
liament gave schools the right to impose regulations regarding uni-
forms because local government can better determine what is 
appropriate considering all of the circumstances.200  The manner in 
which the school created the regulations was not important because 
the substance of the regulations is more important than procedure.201  
Some additional policy considerations include “promot[ing] the abil-
ity of people of diverse races, religions, and cultures to live together 
in harmony.”202
E. R v. Leeds City Council Education203
In Leeds, nine students brought claims against their local educa-
tion authority because the LEA refused to provide the students with 
transportation to the school of their choice.204  The claims were 
brought under the European Convention for Human Rights of 1950 
and the Race Relations Act of 1976.205  All of the students were mem-
bers of a Jewish community in Leeds, England, but were attending 
 193 Id. ¶ 25. 
 194 Id. ¶ 34. 
 195 Denbigh High School, ¶ 34. 
 196 Id. 
 197 Id. ¶ 50. 
 198 Id. ¶ 51. 
 199 Id. ¶ 57. 
 200 Id. ¶ 62•63. 
 201 Denbigh High School, ¶ 68. 
 202 Id. ¶ 97. 
 203 [2005] EWHC 2495 (Admin.). 
 204 Id. ¶ 1. 
 205 Id. ¶ 3. 
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schools in Manchester because their parents wanted them to receive a 
Jewish education.206
A Rabbi who testified on the students’ behalf explained that, al-
though Jewish law does not require the children to attend an ortho-
dox Jewish school, he recommended that they attend such a school if 
possible because Jewish education would ensure that Jewish children 
remained within the faith and would also promote better citizen-
ship.207  The Rabbi added that the city council did not provide a Jew-
ish high school in Leeds, and although a Jewish studies center was 
created at the local high school, it had evolved into a multi-cultural 
center.208  As a result, parents who wanted their children to receive an 
orthodox Jewish education were forced to pay for transportation to 
the high school in Manchester.209
A provision in the free transportation policy states that students 
are eligible for free transportation if the school is outside of the 
Leeds area, a diocese designates the nearest appropriate school, and 
the school is more than three miles away from the student’s home.210  
All of the other students who chose schools outside of Leeds travel 
between 3.4 and 5.9 miles, but the Jewish students wished to attend a 
school located 45 miles away.211  As in the American cases, students 
who live in Leeds and wish to attend a school elsewhere are likely to 
be motivated by sincere religious convictions.212  Furthermore, the 
district estimates that on average it spends approximately £363 per 
year for each student who is provided with free transportation, but it 
would have to pay an estimated £1554 per student to transport the 
Jewish students to Manchester.213  Although only nine students are 
parties to this case, there are currently thirty-three students who 
travel to Manchester to receive an orthodox Jewish education.214
The parties alleged that under the Education Act 1996, the LEA 
was required to provide such transportation.215  The Queen’s Bench 
 206 Id. ¶ 1, 4. 
 207 Id. ¶ 4. 
 208 Id. 
 209 Leeds, ¶ 4. 
 210 Id. ¶ 9. 
 211 Id. ¶ 10. 
 212 Id. ¶ 11. 
 213 Id. ¶ 13. 
 214 Id. 
 215 Leeds, ¶ 16.  In England, parents are required to send children of compulsory 
school age to school.  Education Act, 1996, c. 56, '7.  The Education Act further pro-
vides that 
[a] child shall not be taken to have failed to attend regularly at the 
school if the parent proves- (a) that the school at which the child is a 
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Division considered the following factors: the underlying reasons for 
the parental preference, the suitability of the chosen school, the suit-
ability of an alternate school, various financial considerations, and 
other policy considerations enacted by the LEA.216  Additionally, an 
LEA’s decision not to provide free transportation to a student will not 
be reversed unless it is irrational.217  Due to the cost associated with 
providing the students with free transportation to Manchester and 
the existence of a high school in Leeds which offered some Hebrew 
studies, the Queen’s Bench Division refused to provide free transpor-
tation to the students.218
One persuasive argument offered by the parents is that the 
transportation system is inherently discriminatory.219  For Christian 
children, the LEA will consult with a local diocese, who specifies the 
closest suitable school.220  However, the LEA determined on its own 
that the closest suitable school for the Jewish children is a non-faith 
school in Leeds, “which offers Hebrew studies in years seven and 
eight, some Jewish assemblies, and Hebrew as a modern language.”221  
The court agreed with the LEA that the free transportation program 
was not discriminatory because if a Jewish high school was located 
within a reasonable distance, then the LEA would have authorized 
the free transportation.222  However, the court did not consider that 
there are many more Christian schools in England, so that Christian 
children are more likely to find a suitable school within a relatively 
close distance.  Although the requested transportation services would 
cost the LEA a significant amount of money, the court should have 
considered that all of the Christian students were able to locate a 
suitable school within six miles of Leeds, but the closest Jewish high 
school was forty-five miles away. 
Finally, the parents also asserted several claims under various 
provisions of the European Convention of Human Rights.223  The 
registered pupil is not within walking distance of the child’s home, and 
(b) that no suitable arrangements have been made by the local educa-
tion authority . . . for any of the following- (i) his transport to and from 
the school. 
Education Act, 1996, c. 444, ' 4. 
 216 Leeds, ¶ 18 (citing R v. Dyfed County Council ex parte S, [1944] ELR 320). 
 217 Id. ¶ 17 (citing R (Jones) v. Ceredigion County Council, [2004] EWHC 1376 
(Admin), [2004] ELR 506). 
 218 Id. ¶ 19. 
 219 Id. ¶ 21. 
 220 Id. 
 221 Id. ¶ 26 (internal quotations omitted). 
 222 Leeds, ¶ 28–29. 
 223 Id. ¶ 37. 
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most relevant claim was a violation of the right to practice one’s relig-
ion asserted under Article 9 of the Convention.224  The court also re-
jected this argument stating that “Article 9 does not protect every act 
motivated or inspired by a religion or belief and does not in all cases 
guarantee the right to behave in the public sphere in a way which is 
dictated by a belief.”225  Further, the court held that there must be a 
material infringement on religious rights rather than a mere incon-
venience on the manifestation of one’s religious beliefs.226  Such a 
conclusion is clearly contrary to the delicate tone American courts 
use when analyzing Free Exercise cases. 
One should notice that the claimants in this case asserted several 
claims under both the Education Act and the European Convention 
for Human Rights.227  However, neither one of these enactments ap-
peared to trump the other, at least not within the judge’s opinion.  
This is significantly different from the United States, where plaintiffs 
usually assert that one piece of legislation violates the supreme law of 
the land—the Constitution.  Although England wishes to guarantee 
all of its citizens certain freedoms, judges can refuse to accommodate 
individuals simply based on prior precedent.  Therefore, fewer ex-
emptions seem to be granted in England because the plaintiffs have a 
harder time defining the right and demonstrating that there was a 
material violation. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The United States will grant students more exemptions for reli-
gious reasons than England because it is generally easier for an indi-
vidual to assert his or her fundamental freedoms under the U.S. Con-
stitution.  Although the British system professes equality and 
freedom, it discriminates against minority religions because their 
needs are not inherently accommodated.  Furthermore, as long as 
there are viable alternatives, British courts will not grant exemptions 
to students.  However, most of the time, the alternatives do not en-
tirely satisfy the student’s needs. 
 224 Id. ¶ 37; see supra Part III.A. 
 225 Id. ¶ 39 (citing Sahin v. Turkey, [2004] ELR 520 (Eur. Ct. H.R.)). 
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